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Abstract

On 3 December 2003, the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the UK upheld an
application by IBA Health Ltd for judicial review against the Office of Fair Trading’s decision not to refer the anticipated merger between iSoft Plc and Torex Plc
to the Competition Commissionfor detailed investigation. This is the first case under the new merger control provisions in the Enterprise Act 2002 to come before
the Tribunal for judicial review under Section 120 of that Act.
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23 December 2003
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules on OFT’s Duty to Refer Mergers for Investigation
On 3 December 2003, the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the UK upheld an application by
IBA Health Ltd for judicial review against the Office of Fair Trading's decision not to refer
the anticipated merger between iSoft Plc and Torex Plc to the Competition Commission
for detailed investigation. This is the first case under the new merger control provisions
in the Enterprise Act 2002 to come before the Tribunal for judicial review under Section
120 of that Act.
The judgment of the Competition Appeal Tribunal delimits the role of the Office of Fair
Trading in merger review, essentially allowing the Office of Fair Trading to clear only
those mergers that raise no “grey” issues. Where there is doubt about whether a merger
would result in a substantial lessening competition, the Office of Fair Trading will,
following this judgment, have to refer the case to the Competition Commission for
investigation.
I.

Factual Background and Proceedings before the OFT

On 1 August 2003, the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) received notification of the anticipated
merger between iSoft Plc (“iSoft”) and Torex PLC (“Torex”). Both iSoft and Torex are public
companies, providing software and systems to hospitals and healthcare providers in the UK.
The merger concerned two software applications in particular, Electronic Patient Records
(EPRs) and Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS).
The OFT found that iSoft and Torex were key suppliers to the secondary healthcare sector of
both of these systems. In terms of installed base, the parties would have a combined market
share of 44 percent and 56 percent respectively of the supply of EPRs and LIMS. The OFT also
found that barriers to entry were high and that there was limited supply-side substitutability.
The merger was taking place against the backdrop of the Government’s overhaul of the
procurement system for IT within the National Health Service (the National Programme for IT, or
NPfIT). The NPfIT applies to future IT procurement projects in England and aims to provide
seamless communication in the provision of healthcare services. The NPfIT creates the
concept of a Local Service Provider (“LSP”), essentially a project manager working with the
strategic health authorities to design, manage, finance and implement the IT deployments. The
LSP has the responsibility for nominating Preferred Application Provider(s) (“PAP”) with whom it
will primarily work. Torex had applied and then withdrawn its application to be a LSP while
iSOFT was nominated as a PAP.
On 30 September 2003, the OFT sent an “issues letter” to the parties, setting out nine key
potential competition concerns. These concerns centred on the high market share of
iSoft/Torex and the loss of direct bidding competition between them. Given the high barriers to
entry, one concern was that other providers might not be able to provide a significant
competitive constraint to the merged business. Another concern was the uncertainty as to the
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-2likely effect of the NPfIT in terms of future changes to the competitive landscape and the timing
of such changes.
The OFT held a meeting with iSoft and Torex on 2 October 2003 and received a detailed
submission from iSoft/Torex on 6 October 2003. The decision meeting within the OFT was held
on 8 October 2003. However, the clearance decision was not drafted until almost one month
later. It was approved by the Chairman of the OFT on 6 November 2003.
In its decision, the OFT concluded that it was not necessary to refer the proposed merger
between iSoft and Torex to the Competition Commission (“CC”) on the basis that the merger
would not, and may not be expected to, lead to a substantial lessening of competition on the
relevant market.
The OFT’s decision revolved around the positive effect that the NPfIT would have on the
market. The OFT had not changed its opinion that iSoft and Torex were the two leading
suppliers of IT software to the healthcare sector in the UK. However, it considered that the
NPfIT would fundamentally change the future competitive landscape with the effect that the
parties’ existing strong position would be unlikely, of itself, to confer significant market power on
the merged business. In particular, the OFT found that the increased funding available had
attracted bids from suppliers outside the UK and that the NPfIT’s creation of five LSPs was likely
to increase buyer power, as compared to the previous system.
On 21 November 2003, IBA Health Ltd (“IBA”) applied to the Competition Appeal Tribunal
(“CAT”) for judicial review of the OFT’s decision. IBA is an Australian provider of IT solutions to
the healthcare industry, whose products are sold exclusively through Torex in the UK. IBA had
submitted concerns to the OFT during the review procedure, arguing that its links with Torex
meant that IBA would not be an effective constraint on the merged business and that the
merged business would favour its own products to the detriment of IBA’s. Its concerns were not
shared by the OFT.
In its appeal, IBA alleged that the OFT had made material errors of law and fact in determining
that there was insufficient likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition to oblige a
reference to the CC and that it had made material procedural errors by failing to conduct an
adequate investigation.
II.

The Legal Framework for Merger Review under the Enterprise Act

The Enterprise Act 2002 (the “Act”) replaces the merger provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973
and makes a number of important changes to the UK merger regime. Previously, the decision
as to whether or not to make a reference to the CC was vested in the Secretary of State and it
was for the Secretary of State to determine what action, if any, to take once the CC had
reported its conclusions. The role of the Director General of the OFT was, inter alia, to advise
the Secretary of State on the making of merger references and, where necessary, to negotiate
undertakings in lieu. The Act has changed the roles of the Secretary of State, the CC and the
OFT. The Secretary of State now has no role to play (except in very limited circumstances
involving national security) and the CC now determines the outcome of the reference and any
necessary remedies. As for the OFT, under Section 22 (completed mergers) and Section 33
(anticipated mergers), it has a statutory duty to refer mergers to the CC in certain
circumstances. The Act also provides for judicial review by the CAT of decisions in relation to
merger references.
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Section 33(1) of the Act provides that:
“The OFT shall, subject to subsections (2) and (3), make a reference to the Commission
if the OFT believes that it is or may be the case that … the creation of [a relevant
merger] situation may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition
within any market or markets in the United Kingdom for goods or services”.
Where the OFT considers that it is under a duty to make a reference, it may accept
undertakings from the merging parties in lieu of making the reference (Section 73). There are a
number of criteria to which the OFT must have regard when deciding what undertakings would
be appropriate.
The Act creates a duty on the OFT to publish any reference it makes to the CC or any decision
not to make such a reference. The OFT must also publish the reasons for its decision (Section
107).
III.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal’s judgment

The duty to make a reference
The OFT’s decision in this case not to make a reference to the CC was not based on any of the
exceptions in subsection (2) or on the acceptance of undertakings. Therefore, the CAT’s review
was concerned with the interpretation that should be given to the wording in Section 33(1).
For Section 33(1) to apply and to create a duty to make a reference to the CC, the CAT held
that the OFT must be faced with a real question as to whether the notified merger may be
expected to lead to a substantial lessening of competition. In the CAT's view, the iSoft/Torex
merger created just such a situation. In particular, the parties’ combined market share would be
considerably above the 25 percent threshold which the CC (according to its 2003 Guidelines on
Merger References) would normally view as sufficient to raise potential concerns regarding the
competitive effects of a merger. The CAT was also swayed by the fact that the OFT had set out
a number of clear concerns in the “issues letter” it had sent to the parties which it had not
thereafter rebutted in its decision clearing the merger.
Having held that the OFT was, in fact, faced with a real question as to whether the iSoft/Torex
merger could potentially lead to a substantial lessening of competition, the CAT then turned to
the elements of the duty to make a reference under Section 33(1). It examined Section 33(1),
which requires a reference to be made “if the OFT believes that it is or may be the case that …
the creation of [a relevant merger] situation may be expected to result in a substantial lessening
of competition”, and broke it down into three elements, namely “the OFT believes”, “that it is or
may be the case” and “may be expected to result”.
The CAT found that “believes” requires a belief on reasonable grounds, i.e. with sufficient
supporting material following a sufficient investigation, while “may be expected to result”
requires something less than certainty, roughly a more than 50 percent chance. Neither of
these phrases were considered by the CAT to pose conceptual difficulties or to be of particular
significance to the case at hand.
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central. Essentially, the CAT held that it created a two-step obligation. First, the OFT must
reach the view (on reasonable grounds) that the merger may not be expected to result in a
substantial lessening of competition. Then, the OFT must assess whether there is an
alternative credible view that cannot reasonably be rejected on the basis of a “first screen”. In
other words, if the OFT cannot satisfy itself that there is no significant prospect that the CC
would take a different view in the context of a fuller investigation, then it must make a reference,
even if it itself believes that the proposed merger may not be expected to lead to a substantial
lessening of competition. According to the CAT, “the definitive decision maker, in a case where
there is room for two views, is not the OFT but the Commission. If there is room for two views,
the statutory duty of the OFT is to refer the matter to the Commission, whose duty is to decide
on the question whether the merger may be expected to lead to a substantial lessening of
competition, as section 36(1) expressly requires”.
The CAT took account of the OFT’s own guidance as to the conduct of its proceedings, where it
describes its role as a “first-phase screen” and where it states that “the merger control process
is designed to allow the OFT to identify those where [substantial lessening of competition]
issues may arise, so that they may be examined in greater detail through a reference to the
CC”. Additionally, the CAT found that the timescales under the Act precluded anything more
than a preliminary investigation at the OFT stage. This is in contrast to a review by the CC,
which permits in-depth factual investigation as well as a transparent decision-making process.
The OFT’s review in the case at hand
According to the CAT, the OFT decided not to make a reference to the CC because it believed
that the effect of the NPfIT addressed the concern that the parties’ combined market share
could lead to a substantial lessening of competition. The CAT therefore examined whether the
OFT could reasonably have excluded an alternative view.
In the CAT’s opinion, the OFT’s decision not to refer a horizontal merger between the number 1
and 2 players in the market, with combined market shares in the 45-55 percent range, required
a “proper factual basis and exceptional clarity of analysis”. The CAT found that the OFT’s
decision did not meet this standard. First, despite coming to the conclusion that a reference
was unnecessary only a week after sending the detailed issues letter to the parties, the OFT’s
decision contained no detailed rebuttal of the matters highlighted in the issues letter. Secondly,
in its pleadings, the OFT recognized that the case left room for differences of opinion. Thirdly,
the decision lacked a clear explanation of how the market in question functioned and how the
NPfIT would impact the market.
On this basis, the CAT was not satisfied that the OFT had properly examined whether there was
an alternative credible view that the proposed merger could lead to a substantial lessening of
competition or that the OFT had taken all material considerations into account. The CAT also
concluded that the facts underlying the OFT’s reasoning were not sufficiently set out in the
OFT’s decision so as to enable it to review whether the OFT's conclusion was properly founded.

http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art34

-5IV.

Commentary on the CAT’s judgment and its future impact

The limited role to be played by the OFT
The judgment of the CAT severely circumscribes the role to be played by the OFT in UK merger
review. Broadly, the CAT found that the OFT should attempt to decide complex cases only in
exceptional cases and that its role as a “first screen” is not to decide between which factual
scenarios it prefers but, where it determines that there is more than one credible scenario, it is
required to pass the matter on to the CC for a full investigation and final decision. Accordingly,
the OFT can only clear a merger itself at “first screen” stage where there are no “grey” issues.
While it has always been the case that the OFT would recommend to the Secretary of State the
reference of mergers giving rise to serious competition concerns (in the absence of any feasible
remedies in lieu of such a reference), references to the CC have been relatively rare (generally
less than a handful in any year). Although the OFT itself describes its role as being that of a
“first screen”, the CAT’s judgment goes further and essentially turns the OFT into a clearing
house, allowed to decide only “open and shut” cases and bound to refer all others to the CC.
Such a position stands in contrast to the role of the European Commission under the EC Merger
Regulation, whose duty to carry out a detailed “Phase II” investigation does not arise unless it
considers that a proposed merger “raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market”. For mergers that do not meet this threshold, clearance can be received at the end of
the four week initial review period (equivalent to the period allotted to OFT for its review). Given
the recent focus on decentralization and the resulting need for a consistent approach to
competition law enforcement across the EU, it is somewhat unfortunate that the UK CAT
diverges from the EU approach to such an extent in this area.
For companies planning to merge, the limited role envisaged by the CAT for the OFT in merger
review is likely to prove very problematic. Unlike the mandatory requirement to notify mergers
of a Community dimension under the EC Merger Regulation, the merger notification system in
the UK is voluntary. An unnotified merger cannot be investigated if no steps have been taken to
make a reference within a four month period after closing of the merger. Nevertheless, if a
reference is made within that four month period, the merging parties are at risk of divestment
remedies being ordered should a significant lessening of competition be found. Companies
have always had the option of seeking confidential guidance of the OFT as to the likelihood of a
reference being made. This route now appears to be jeopardised, as the OFT would only be in
a position to give such guidance in clear-cut cases, i.e., those on which companies would not in
any event have sought guidance in the first place.
Where the merger raises more complex issues, companies could now either choose to sit out
the four month period or notify the transaction in the full anticipation of a lengthy review period.
In those circumstances, it would in fact be preferable (were it permitted) to by-pass the OFT and
go straight to the CC. Similarly, the CAT's interpretation of the statutory test for reference may
inhibit companies from offering, and the OFT from accepting, undertakings in lieu of making a
reference. Such undertakings can only be sought where competition issues are identified, i.e.,
where the test for reference is met. In those circumstances, the OFT may prefer to refer the
merger to the CC and companies may also prefer this, given that third parties may successfully
argue that, as has been criticised by the CAT, the review period and process before the OFT is
inherently inadequate for a full review where “grey” issues have been identified.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

-6The scope of the review undertaken by the CAT
According to Section 120 of the Act, when it reviews an OFT decision not to make a reference,
the CAT “shall apply the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for
judicial review”. The OFT argued before the CAT that, under established judicial review
principles, the review should be confined to a consideration of whether the decision not to make
a reference was based on (i) a misunderstanding of law; (ii) a material procedural error; (iii) a
material error of fact which was “beyond the bounds of rationality”; or (iv) where the decision
was “unreasonable” in the sense that it was “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to
be decided could have arrived at it”.
In its judgment, the CAT appears to have taken a broad view of its judicial review powers in
cases under Section 120. The CAT stated that its review concerned the process undertaken by
the OFT, rather than the facts presented by the iSoft/Torex merger. However, it also held that,
as a specialized tribunal, it was not bound to defer to the OFT (a specialized decision-maker) in
the way that an ordinary tribunal or court would be. As a result, the CAT carried out a factintensive review of whether the OFT could reasonably have come to the view that there was no
credible alternative to the finding that the merger would not lead to a substantial lessening of
competition. Although the CAT did not attempt to rule on the factual issues it raised, the level of
detail with which it examined the facts before the OFT is surprising in the context of
conventional judicial review in the UK.
The OFT’s response
The OFT has applied for leave to appeal the CAT’s judgment. The OFT alleges that the CAT
incorrectly interpreted the duty to make a reference under Section 33(1) and that it overstepped
the boundaries of its powers of review under Section 120. Under Section 120(6) of the Act, an
appeal lies only on points of law. It can be anticipated that such points of law would include
whether (i) the CAT has correctly identified that Section 33(1) implies a two-limbed test which
requires the OFT to satisfy itself that there can be no alternative credible view of the likely
effects of the merger; and (ii) whether the grounds of judicial review in competition cases permit
the CAT to intervene on the basis that it is not clear from the decision that all material
considerations have been taken into account and all material facts established.
Until its appeal is heard, the OFT has indicated that it will abide by the CAT’s ruling and has recommenced its investigation of the merger.
* * *
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-7This Bulletin has been prepared in consultation with Suyong Kim, who will head WCP’s London
competition practice from January 1, 2004. If you have any questions about the UK merger
control system, please do not hesitate to contact her or any of the lawyers listed below.

WCP ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION GROUP
In Brussels:
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
John Ratliff
Charles Stark
Paul Von Hehn
Marco Bronckers
Thomas Mueller

In Berlin:
Karlheinz Quack
Ulrich Quack
Natalie Luebben

In Washington, DC:
William Kolasky
Douglas Melamed
Robert Bell
Veronica Kayne
John Rounsaville
James Lowe

+32 (2) 285.49.00
Christian Duvernoy
Yves Van Gerven
Sven Voelcker
Frédéric Louis
Eric Mahr
Natalie McNelis

Antonio Capobianco
Pablo Charro
Axel Desmedt
Flavia Distefano
Martin Goyette
Axel Gutermuth

Jan Heithecker
Lorelien Hoet
Anne Vallery
Naboth van den Broek
Deirdre Waters

+49 (30) 20.22.64.00
Rainer Velte
Markus Hutschneider
Joerg Karenfort

Stefan Ohlhoff
Hartmut Schneider
Ruediger Schuett

Andreas Zuber
Alexander Juengling

+1 (202) 663.6000
Ali Stoeppelwerth
Leon Greenfield
Jeffrey Ayer
Janet Ridge
Yaa Apori
Laura Batenic

Nicole Berry
Aaron Brinkman
Richard Elliott
James Frost
Jacqueline Haberer
Ron Katwan

David Olsky
Jeffrey Rogers
Jeffrey Schomig

All attorneys can be reached via email by first name.last name@wilmer.com
This bulletin is for general informational purposes only and does not represent our
legal advice as to any particular set of facts, nor does this bulletin represent any
undertaking to keep recipients advised as to all relevant legal developments.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

